Before a state trial court in Chicago, CCL President Robert S. Peck argued that the Illinois two-filing rule had to yield to the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute because of the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. 

      In the underlying case, a husband and wife sued Best Buy when the store refused to provide satisfaction on a expensive plasma television set that could not be repaired or replaced under the Geek Squad Protection Plan (GSPP) they purchased as an extended warranty for the television set. Best Buy contends that the GSPP is merely a service plan that allows them to replace the television set for one of similar quality, even though its value is a fraction of the set they originally purchased. Best Buy sold the GSPP to them characterizing it as an extended warranty and advertises the plan as a warranty. The purchasers made their claims under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, which prevents manufacturers and sellers from denying an implied warranty, even if not phrased that way. 

      The prime issue before the court was the statute of limitations. The family, the Wares, originally filed their action in federal court in Florida against Best Buy and Samsung. When the court found it lacked personal jurisdiction, the couple filed in federal court in Illinois, which held that the GSPP was not a warranty. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit independently raised a question of subject-matter jurisdiction after briefing and argument on the warranty issue. Because Magnuson-Moss requires 100 named plaintiffs for the case to be heard in federal court, but only one plaintiff to file the same action in state court, Peck asked the Seventh Circuit to vacate the district court decision and order the case dismissed without prejudice so it can be refiled in state court under the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute. The Seventh Circuit found that the suggestion was the correct one and followed Peck's suggestion.

     One refiled within 30 days in state court in compliance with 28 U.S.C. 1367, Best Buy, the only remaining defendant, moved to dismiss, arguing that the Wares needed to plead supplemental jurisdiction and that Illinois's one-re-file rule prevented the court from entertaining the case. Peck argued that precedent, including one from the Sixth Circuit, held that supplemental jurisdiction need not be pleaded. In addition, under Jinks v. Richland County, which Peck argued in the Supreme Court, state law cannot interpose a bar to the realization of Congress's determination that state law is tolled while a qualifying case is in federal court and for another 30 days afterwards when dismissed without prejudice. 

     Co-counsel Kyla Lemieux argued the other issues. The case was taken under advisement.